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NOTE

THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: IMAGINING AN EQUITABLE APPROACH AND
APPLYING IT TO BROKEN PROMISES IN DETROIT
Gabe Chess*
Courts have widely adopted a heightened standard for recognizing third-party
beneficiaries of government contracts. But the justifications offered for the
heightened standard do not withstand scrutiny. Instead, courts should apply a
series of equitable factors to produce results consistent with the concern for
“manifest justice” that animates third-party beneficiary doctrine. Governments make contracts frequently, often to address issues of huge importance to
their citizens, including housing, economic development, and healthcare. In
each of these areas, third-party beneficiary doctrine may be an important avenue of relief to citizens harmed by broken promises and may encourage the
government and its contracting partners to more seriously include citizens in
their decisionmaking. This Note proposes reforms to third-party beneficiary
doctrine necessary for that to happen and applies those reforms to a pair of
government contracts made in Detroit.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1929, the Ford Motor Company commenced construction of a 12,000foot-long tunnel to carry more than 913,600,000 gallons of water a day from
the Detroit River to its River Rouge plant. 1 It was nearly twice the amount of
purified water used daily in the entire city of Detroit. 2 The city awarded Ford
a contract to construct the tunnel, which the city would own and then lease
back to the company for one dollar a year. 3 Ford promised to pay for any damage to private property resulting from construction. 4
During construction, Ford badly damaged a privately owned building. 5
The owners of that building brought suit against Ford after the company refused to pay for repairs. 6 The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that

1. William W. Dulmage, The Raw Water Supply of the Ford Motor Company, 30 J. AM.
WATER WORKS ASS’N 67, 68–70 (1938).
2. Bator v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W. 906, 907 (Mich. 1934).
3. Id. at 908.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 908–09.
6. Id. at 913.
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they were third-party beneficiaries of Ford’s promise. 7 The Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed in Bator v. Ford Motor Co., reasoning that, despite the complexity of the case and lack of authorities squarely on point, “[t]o hold that
these plaintiffs are without remedy” would be “shocking to one who believes
that American liberties are founded on the principle of justice.” 8
The actors and tensions at work in this case resonate today in Detroit and
in municipal landscapes across the United States. 9 Powerful corporations continue to contract with cities and, in doing so, receive considerable private benefit. 10 Yet, much like in Bator, issues can arise in the performance of
government contracts. In such cases, third-party beneficiary doctrine may be
necessary to avoid shocking results. But given the emergence throughout the
twentieth century of a heightened standard applied when plaintiffs claim to be
third-party beneficiaries of government contracts, it seems unlikely that Bator
would come out today as it did then.
This Note argues that the heightened standard courts often cite for recognizing third-party beneficiaries of government contracts is inconsistent with
the principles underlying third-party beneficiary doctrine. In place of that special rule, courts should apply a set of equitable considerations that are consistent with the doctrine’s original rationale. These principles, rather than the
current rule, will lead to results more consistent with the concern for substantive justice at the core of the doctrine. Widespread privatization amplifies the
need for this reform. As illustrated by this Note’s analysis of the doctrine at
work in Detroit, privatization that is nominally intended to help citizens too
often fails to deliver. A reformed approach could empower those citizens.
The analysis in this Note operates from a pair of baseline assumptions.
First, the effects of privatization, defined here as the provision of public services through private interests, are felt most directly by communities of color
7. Id.
8. Id. at 914.
9. See IN THE PUB. INT., HOW PRIVATIZATION INCREASES INEQUALITY 3 (2016),
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/InthePublicInterest_InequalityReport_
Sept2016.pdf [perma.cc/WE3B-GANN] (“[P]rivatization, a key pillar of political attacks on government in the last few decades, has weakened many public goods and services . . . .”); John B.
Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 26 (“[I]n the 1980s, the tide of public sector expansion began to turn in many
parts of the world. In the United States, the Reagan administration issued new marching orders:
‘Don’t just stand there, undo something.’ A central tenet of the ‘undoing’ has been the privatization of government assets and services.”).
10. In addition to the examples that follow in Part III, see, for example, John Gallagher,
Dan Gilbert Gets State OK for $618M in Tax Breaks for Detroit Projects, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May
22, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/john-gallagher/2018/05/22/
dan-gilbert-detroit-projects-tax-breaks/630257002 [perma.cc/BWG2-HMRE]; Kat Stafford & Allie Gross, Ford Closer to Securing $103M in Tax Breaks from Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 17,
2018, 1:52 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2018/10/16/fordmichigan-central-station-tax/1651079002 [perma.cc/KE6Z-CT4Z]; and Adrienne Roberts, Plans
for Amazon Distribution Center Gets Detroit City Council Approval, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 20,
2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/10/20/amazondistribution-center-detroit-city-council/5989217002 [perma.cc/787V-HGS3].
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and marginalized, poor, and less politically powerful people. 11 And second,
both public and private law should serve the end of full and equal participation
in democratic self-governance. A reformed third-party beneficiary doctrine
can contribute to that end by recognizing legal rights that, in turn, empower
citizen organizing around and participation in political decisionmaking in the
face of increased privatization. 12
In Part I, this Note reviews the history of third-party beneficiary doctrine
in the context of government contracts and argues that the often-applied
heightened standard of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 313 is unjustified. Part II outlines three equitable considerations that courts should emphasize in place of the standard of section 313: who stands to benefit from
performance of the contract, the availability of other remedies to the plaintiffs,
and the form of damages sought. Part III tests those equitable principles
against two government contracts made in Detroit. Those contracts are the
kind of government contracts where third-party beneficiaries plausibly exist,
yet section 313 is likely to bar their claims.
I.

A SPECIAL RULE FOR THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS TO
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

Modern courts often apply a special rule to third-party beneficiary claims
to government contracts. 13 This rule amounts to a heightened standard, requiring more of would-be third-party beneficiaries of government contracts
than is required when parties claim to be beneficiaries of contracts not involving the government. 14 In Section I.A, this Note discusses the special rule’s history and its rationales. Section I.B argues that those rationales do not justify
the special treatment of third-party beneficiary claims to government contracts.
A. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Government Contracts
The third-party beneficiary doctrine abrogated a touchstone maxim of
contract law—the requirement of privity. 15 Its development has been described as a “minor theoretical revolution.” 16 Breaking from the privity requirement, the third-party beneficiary doctrine says that, in certain

11. See IN THE PUB. INT., supra note 9, at 1.
12. See, e.g., Patience A. Crowder, More than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary
Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 333 (2010) (exploring how third-party beneficiary doctrine can contribute to more “coordinated and inclusive
redevelopment”).
13. See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
15. Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112–13 (1985).
16. Id. at 1113.
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circumstances, a third party to the contract may enforce its terms. 17 Courts
allowing these claims generally require that the contracting parties must enter
the contract with the intent to benefit the third party.18 Some courts also require that the benefit be either intended as a gift to the third party or meant to
satisfy the promisee’s preexisting duty to the third party. 19 In the former situation, the third party is dubbed a donee beneficiary, and in the latter, a creditor
beneficiary. 20 This novel rule “developed teleologically” so as to do “justice . . . between man and man.” 21 It has, at its core, a concern for “someone
outside of the act of contracting.” 22
As third-party beneficiary doctrine spread across U.S. jurisdictions, 23
concerns particular to recognizing third-party beneficiaries of government
contracts arose, 24 including: (1) that all government contracts may be characterized as being for the benefit of the public, (2) that the possible liability to
third-party beneficiaries of those contracts may therefore be expansive, and
(3) that resulting costs for any party contracting with the government may be
prohibitive. 25
These underlying concerns were famously articulated by then-Chief
Judge Cardozo’s opinion in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 26 There, a
fire destroyed the plaintiff’s warehouse. 27 The city had contracted with a water
company to provide water to fire hydrants at a specified pressure level. The

17. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. L. INST. 1932).
18. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1378
(1992) (“The test in most common use has been whether the promisee—or, in some formulations, the parties to the contract—intended to benefit the third-party beneficiary.”).
19. E.g., Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa. 1983) (“There is thus a two part test
for determining whether one is an intended third party beneficiary: (1) the recognition of the
beneficiary’s right must be ‘appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties,’ and (2) the
performance must ‘satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary’ or ‘the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.’ ” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. L. INST.
1981))).
20. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. L. INST. 1932).
21. See Waters, supra note 15, at 1151, 1199 (discussing the origins of third-party beneficiary doctrine as a move away from the formal requirement of privity so as to do justice).
22. Id. at 1112.
23. Id. at 1113, 1150–72.
24. See, e.g., German All. Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220 (1912) (denying a third-party beneficiary claim against a water company that breached its municipal water
contract because the city was under no obligation to provide water to the plaintiff). This case
predates Moch but bears a close factual resemblance. See infra notes 26–37 and accompanying
text.
25. Waters, supra note 15, at 1201; Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1407–09 (“[I]f third-party
beneficiaries can enforce such contracts against the private actor, the result may be the imposition of liability well out of proportion to the benefits the private actor stood to receive under the
contract.”).
26. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
27. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896.
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plaintiff claimed that, had the company performed their contract obligations,
the fire would have been extinguished and would not have reached his warehouse. 28 He brought a third-party beneficiary claim against the water company for breaching its contract with the city. 29
A unanimous court dismissed the claim. 30 Cardozo noted that “[n]o legal
duty rests upon a city to supply its inhabitants with protection against fire.” 31
He went on to acknowledge that a contract like that at issue in this case could
create a third-party beneficiary, but only if an “intention appears [in the contract] that the promisor is to be answerable to individual members of the public as well as to the city for any loss ensuing from the failure to fulfill the
promise.” 32 Here, he said, that intention did not appear in the contract. 33
Cardozo observed that “[i]n a broad sense it is true that every city contract, not improvident or wasteful, is for the benefit of the public.” 34 But, because of this reality, he demanded that the contracting parties must have
intended to allow this particular member of the public to hold the water company liable for breach in court. 35 To hold otherwise would expand liability beyond reasonable limits and burden the water company with an “assumption
of a risk . . . overwhelming” the relatively modest compensation it received. 36
To illustrate the concern, Cardozo imagined a visitor to an unheated public
building who caught a cold holding liable the company that contracted with
the government to heat the building. 37
Similar concerns have led courts to often give special treatment to thirdparty beneficiary claims to government contracts. 38 Both the First and Second
Restatements include provisions speaking directly to recognition of thirdparty beneficiaries of government contracts. 39 Courts have characterized these
rules as embodying a “presumption against finding third-party liability” to
those contracts. 40 Courts often demand that the parties not only intend to benefit the third party but that they also intend to allow the third party to enforce

28. Id. at 897.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 899. Cardozo also dismissed the plaintiff’s tort and breach of statutory duty
claims. Id.
31. Id. at 897. This reasoning was important to distinguish the underlying legal duty owed
by a debtor to the creditor, which exists in the creditor–beneficiary category of third-party beneficiary claims. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
32. Moch, 159 N.E. at 897.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 898.
37. Id.
38. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1406.
39. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 145 (AM. L. INST. 1932); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
40. Cooper v. Charter Commc’ns Ents. I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2014).
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the contract in court. 41 But with nongovernmental contracts, courts only go so
far as to discern the intent to benefit the third party in forming the contract.42
The inquiry in governmental cases creates a significantly higher burden for
would-be third-party beneficiaries to meet. 43
Despite the heightened standard, claims brought by parties seeking recognition as third-party beneficiaries of government contracts are plentiful. 44
And courts do occasionally recognize those plaintiffs’ rights under the contract. 45
B. Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 313 and the Problem of the
Heightened Standard for Government Contracts
Section 313 reflects the special treatment courts give to third-party beneficiary claims to government contracts. Courts frequently cite the rule 46 and,
despite the rule’s language indicating it is not to be applied to all claims on
government contracts, often apply it as a blanket standard. 47 It is appropriate,
then, to assess the approach courts take to these claims by first assessing section 313. Section 313 has been plagued by the same problems that arise with

41. E.g., Martinez v. Socoma Cos. 521 P.2d 841, 847 (Cal. 1974) (“It is this absence of any
manifestation of intent that defendants should pay compensation for breach to persons in the
position of plaintiffs that distinguishes this case . . . .”); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v.
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The plain language of the Contract . . . illustrates
[no] intention . . . to grant the Irrigators enforceable rights.”).
42. See, e.g., Scarpitti v. Weborg, 609 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1992) (holding that a third-party
beneficiary claim may be asserted so long as it is appropriate in carrying out the intent of the
parties who formed the contract and that the third-party beneficiary is either a donee beneficiary
or creditor beneficiary).
43. Compare id. at 149 (“[C]ontracting parties must have expressed an intention that the
third party be a beneficiary . . . .”), with Klamath, 204 F.3d at 1211 (“Parties that benefit from a
government contract are generally assumed to be incidental beneficiaries, and may not enforce
the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary.”).
44. Waters, supra note 15, at 1173.
45. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (recognizing parties injured in
plane crash as third-party beneficiaries to a municipality’s contract with the Federal Aviation
Administration); Just’s, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 997 (Idaho 1978) (recognizing a
business in local tax improvement district as a third-party beneficiary to contract between a construction company and the city to renovate that district); Hook v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 972 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing people incarcerated in an Arizona prison as third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree entered into by the Arizona Department of Corrections); Zigas v.
Superior Ct. of S.F., 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing tenants as third-party
beneficiaries of a landlord’s contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
46. E.g., Medevac MidAtlantic, LLC v. Keystone Mercy Health Plan, 817 F. Supp. 2d 515,
531 (E.D. Pa. 2011); McMurphy v. State, 757 A.2d 1043, 1050 (Vt. 2000).
47. Crowder, supra note 12, at 318; see also Cooper v. Charter Commc’ns Ents. I, LLC,
760 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[G]overnment contracts by their very nature tend to benefit
the public . . . .”).
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third-party beneficiary doctrine outside of the government context. The application of the doctrine is inconsistent and unpredictable, 48 hindering courts’
ability to apply the doctrine in a manner true to its emphasis on substantive
justice. 49
But there are a few particular issues that arise with government contracts,
each of which militates against imposing the heightened standard of section
313 to all government contracts. The first is the flawed nature of the rule’s
most commonly invoked rationale: that recognizing third-party beneficiaries
of government contracts will create large and limitless liability to unforeseeable classes of plaintiffs. 50 The second is a misapprehension of sovereign immunity and third-party beneficiary doctrine itself. These intertwined
misconceptions have led courts to suggest that section 313’s heightened standard is justified by a lack of preexisting governmental liability to the citizen.
The third is an overly formalistic application of the creditor beneficiary and
donee beneficiary categories, which has led courts to resist recognizing thirdparty beneficiaries of government contracts. And fourth is the uniquely unpredictable nature of the government as a contracting partner, which, if anything, favors a more liberal application of third-party beneficiary doctrine.
1.

The Flawed Underpinnings of a Special Standard for Government
Contracts

Underpinning the development of the special standard for government
contracts is a fear of runaway liability for parties contracting with the government. 51 However, that fear applies equally to nongovernmental contracts.
In his seminal article on third-party beneficiaries, Professor Melvin Eisenberg explained the need to limit the creation of third-party beneficiaries to

48. See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule Under
Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 923 (1984) (discussing
how even outside of the governmental context the intent-to-benefit requirement for parties
claiming third-party beneficiary status has been “difficult to apply in a consistent manner”). As
an illustration of the similarly inconsistent application of the doctrine in the government context, compare Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 09–cv–1985, 2010 WL 3212131,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding that a contract between loan servicers and Fannie Mae
“evinces a clear intent to directly benefit eligible borrowers”), with Speleos v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that the plain language of the
same agreement “precluded” an argument that eligible borrowers were the intended beneficiaries of that agreement with standing to enforce it as third-party beneficiaries).
49. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 48, at 939–40 (discussing how, even with nongovernment
contracts, courts “improperly allow intended beneficiaries to fall into a gap” when applying certain forms of the third-party beneficiary test); Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 521 P.2d 841, 843 (Cal.
1974) (leaving local residents who had been classified as the “hard-core unemployed” with no
remedy when the company that promised the Department of Labor to create jobs for them failed
to do so).
50. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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appropriate circumstances because of this same fear of runaway liability. 52
Proposing a hypothetical completely devoid of government involvement, Eisenberg imagined the runaway liability that would ensue if every link in a supply chain, from the retailer up, could sue a vendor who failed to deliver a part
that the retailer’s manufacturer needed in order to deliver goods to the retailer
on time. 53 He posited that the manufacturer and vendor would never have
agreed to a term allowing the retailer to enforce their contract because doing
so would have imposed prohibitively high liability on the vendor. 54
This is the same kind of runaway liability that Cardozo feared in Moch.55
But, as Eisenberg’s hypothetical makes clear, this fear is not unique to government contracts. Cardozo seemed to recognize this and grappled with the same
concern outside of the government context. Fear of runaway liability motivated him to apply rules that avoided exposing defendants to “liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class” 56
in both contract and tort cases entirely absent any government involvement.
This fear, then, does not seem to be particular to any feature of third-party
beneficiary claims on government contracts. It emerges not from some unique
characteristic of these claims but more generally from the nature of legal liability as imposed by private law. Standing alone, this fear cannot justify a special rule for government contracts.
2.

Section 313’s Misguided Sensitivity to Sovereign Immunity

Courts have also justified the special rule for third-party beneficiary
claims on government contracts by pointing out that, absent the formation of
a contract, the third party seeking the benefit of the contract would have had
no legal right to demand that benefit from the government. 57 Lack of an underlying liability has led courts to deem these cases outside of the creditor–
beneficiary category. 58 This justification falls short in that it misapprehends
the government’s immunity from legal liability and forgets that third-party
beneficiary doctrine often creates new legal liability where none existed before.

52. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1374–76.
53. Id. at 1374–75.
54. Id. at 1375–76.
55. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
56. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). Cardozo supported limiting the liability in Ultramares through the duty requirement by citing to a string of third-party
beneficiary cases, including Moch. Id. at 181. In doing so, he bemoaned “[t]he assault upon the
citadel of privity.” Id. at 445.
57. See, e.g., Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 521 P.2d 841, 845 (Cal. 1974) (“Clearly the Government . . . at no time bore any legal duty toward plaintiffs to provide the benefits set forth in
the contracts . . . .”).
58. E.g., id. (“[P]laintiffs do not claim to be creditor beneficiaries.”).
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The supposed lack of an underlying governmental liability to citizens
flows from misconceptions about sovereign immunity. 59 Sovereign immunity
does not stand for the principle that the government owes no obligation to the
citizenry or is incapable of breaching its duties. 60 Instead, it is simply a legal
shield, prohibiting courts from imposing liability on governments. 61 Therefore, even where a sovereign is immune to legal liability, it may still be contracting to fulfill its obligations to citizens.
Moreover, many third-party beneficiary cases create a new legal liability
to the third-party beneficiary where no liability existed before the contract was
formed. Donee beneficiary cases—cases in which the contract is formed to
give a gift to the third party—always involve the creation of a new legal liability. 62 Prior to the formation of the contract, the party meant to receive the gift
had no right to demand it. 63
This reality, that third-party beneficiary doctrine is comfortable with the
creation of legal liability where none existed before, is evident in the case credited with creating the doctrine, Lawrence v. Fox. 64 There, the plaintiff, Lawrence, was owed a three-hundred-dollar gambling debt by a man named
Hawley. 65 At the time, gambling debts were unenforceable at law in a New
York state court, so Lawrence had no legal claim for the debt against Hawley. 66
But Hawley then loaned three hundred dollars to another man, Fox, in exchange for Fox’s promise to pay off Hawley’s debt to Lawrence. 67 When Fox
did not pay Lawrence the three hundred dollars, Lawrence sued Fox to recover

59. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“ ‘[T]he Eleventh Amendment [stands for] the presupposition . . . which it confirms’[:] . . . that each State is a sovereign
entity in our federal system; and . . . that ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . .’ ” (fourth alteration in original)
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 780 n.1 (1991) and Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890))); Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375–76 (1899) (“The [federal]
[g]overnment is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability in suit cannot be
extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it.”).
60. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1212
(2001) (summarizing that Kimel effectively said “states are left free to disregard federal law.”).
61. Price, 174 U.S. at 375–76 (“It matters not what may seem to this court equitable . . . . Beyond the letter of such [statutory] consent the courts may not go, no matter how beneficial . . . their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities of the government.”);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73 (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III . . . .” (emphasis added)).
62. See, e.g., Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918) (allowing a niece standing as a
third-party beneficiary to enforce her uncle’s promise to his dying wife to give her house to the
niece).
63. See id.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1363 (“Lawrence v. Fox is often celebrated today as a landmark case that established the power of a third-party beneficiary to bring suit . . . .”).
65. Waters, supra note 15, at 1122–26. Note that Lawrence misspells Hawley’s name as
Holly in its opinion. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 269 (1859).
66. Waters, supra note 15, at 1127–28.
67. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 268–69.
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the money. 68 Despite the fact that Lawrence had no legal claim against Hawley
for the initial debt because it was a gambling debt, the court held that Lawrence could enforce the contract Fox had entered with Hawley and demand
that Fox pay him the three hundred dollars. 69 From its earliest days, then,
third-party beneficiary doctrine has dealt with the creation of a new legal liability through contract where no legal liability existed before. Hawley certainly
owed Lawrence a debt and was wronging him by failing to pay that debt. But
that wrong was not one cognizable in a New York State court and, as such,
was not a debt that created legal liability. 70
The contract’s creation of a new legal liability flowing from Fox to Lawrence, despite the lack of a previous liability flowing from Hawley to Lawrence,
parallels the structure in government contracts. While we do speak of the government as having a general duty of care to the citizenry, we do not always
recognize it as a duty that creates legal liability. 71 When the government contracts, the creation of liability in promisors to a third-party beneficiary is no
more anomalous than creating liability in Fox to Lawrence, despite the fact
that Lawrence had no avenue to bring a legal claim against Hawley. Therefore,
there is no doctrinal issue with allowing the creation of a new liability in the
promisor despite the government’s shield from legal liability that is sovereign
immunity.
This is not to say that sovereign immunity concerns are irrelevant to the
application of third-party beneficiary doctrine to government contracts.
There are some situations in which sovereign immunity should shield private
parties that contract with governments. 72 But deciding if that shield is transferred entails a fact-specific inquiry particular to the concerns that motivate

68. Id.
69. Id. at 268.
70. See Waters, supra note 15, at 1127.
71. See, e.g., John H. Derrick, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty Was Owed Under
Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, § 2 (1985) (contrasting the government’s duty to all, which
most jurisdictions do not treat as a duty that creates tort liability, to the special duty the government can owe to particular citizens, which does create tort liability).
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled
that the reference [in the Eleventh Amendment] to actions ‘against one of the United States’
encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.” (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270, 286 (1885)).
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sovereign immunity. 73 This test conveys sovereign immunity only when holding the defendant liable “would expose the government to financial liability or
interfere with the administration of government programs.” 74
Because courts often speak of section 313 as a blanket rule applicable to
all governmental contracts, 75 the rule elides the more subtle analysis courts
undertake when asking if a party is an arm of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity. The policy considerations underpinning sovereign immunity
may call for special treatment of some third-party beneficiary claims to government contracts, but this treatment is not reflected in the heightened standard of section 313. 76 Rather than muddying third-party beneficiary doctrine
by conflating sovereign immunity concerns with the third-party beneficiary
analysis, courts should address sovereign immunity separately by allowing
parties to plead and make out that defense where they believe it applies. 77
3.

An Overly Formalistic View of Creditor Beneficiary and Donee
Beneficiary Categories

As third-party beneficiary doctrine gained traction, courts and commentators adopted categorical descriptions of common situations in which a
third-party beneficiary was created by a contract. 78 Those two situations were
contracts that created (1) donee beneficiaries and (2) creditor beneficiaries. 79
Courts continue to look to these categories when determining if a third-party
beneficiary can enforce a contract. 80
Courts struggle with slotting plaintiffs asserting third-party beneficiary
rights under government contracts into one of these categories. They note that
the creditor beneficiary category seems inappropriate because the plaintiffs

73. See, e.g., Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311
(11th Cir. 2000) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity may extend to defendants other than the
State based upon: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; and (3) from where the entity derives its funds and who is responsible for
judgments against the entity. . . . The pertinent inquiry is not into the nature of a corporation’s
status in the abstract, but its function or role in a particular context.”).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 332 (2015) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he modern jurisprudence permitting intended beneficiaries to sue does not generally apply to contracts between a private party and the government . . . .”).
76. See infra Section II.C.
77. See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003) (analyzing sovereign immunity as a defense
in a breach of contract suit by applying the arm-of-state test used in immunity analysis); Stewart
ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson, 804 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 2002) (analyzing sovereign immunity
as a defense to a breach of contract claim brought under third-party beneficiary theory).
78. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1373–74.
79. Id.; see also supra note 19–20 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 19–20 and accompanying text.
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would not have had a preexisting legal right against the government. 81 But
they also deem the donee beneficiary category inapplicable because they do
not conceive of a government’s provision of services to citizens as a gift in any
real sense of that term. 82
But this supposed difficulty with fitting third-party beneficiaries of government contracts into these categories overstates the problem and reflects an
overly formalistic view of the categories themselves. Consequently, it fails as a
justification for special treatment of government contracts.
Third-party beneficiaries of government contracts share characteristics
with both creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries. Even in Lawrence—
the quintessential creditor beneficiary case—the third-party beneficiary did
not have a preexisting legal right against the promisee but instead had a claim
that the promisee owed him a sort of moral duty (to repay the gambling
debt). 83 Accordingly, courts could plausibly treat third-party beneficiary
claims to government contracts like creditor beneficiary cases, where the citizen lacked a legal right against the government (the promisee) but nonetheless
was owed a general duty of care by the government. 84
Third-party beneficiary claims to government contracts also share a crucial characteristic with donee beneficiary claims. At first blush, the emphasis
on donative intent to give a gift in donee beneficiary cases does not fit well
with any conception of the government’s intent when contracting to benefit
citizens. 85 But the donee beneficiary category is not actually rooted in the parties’ intent to give a gift. Instead, the need to recognize donee beneficiaries is
explained by the reality that donee beneficiaries are those beneficiaries who
have a strong interest in performance of the contract in situations where the
promisee themself lacks a strong interest in performance. 86 Recognizing this
as the rationale for allowing donee beneficiary claims makes clear that in certain instances, third-party beneficiaries of government contracts can be understood as having a right under the contract for the same reason as donee
beneficiaries. Where citizens have a stronger interest in seeing the government’s contract performed than the government themselves, they share this
key characteristic with donee beneficiaries.

81. See, e.g., H.R. Moch. Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928) (“No
legal duty rests upon a city to supply its inhabitants with protection against fire. That being so,
a member of the public may not maintain an action under Lawrence v. Fox . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
82. E.g., Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 521 P.2d 841, 845 (Cal. 1974) (“[P]laintiffs do not claim
to be creditor beneficiaries . . . . [T]he fact that a Government program for social betterment
confers benefits upon individuals . . . does not necessarily imply that the benefits are intended as
gifts.”).
83. See supra Section I.B.2.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. See infra Section II.A.
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The donee and creditor beneficiary categories were adopted as ways of
describing common situations in which it was fair to allow a third-party beneficiary to enforce the contract. 87 Where the same dynamics that call for recognition of third-party beneficiaries in those common situations exist in other
situations, an overly formalistic adherence to the terms of the categories is unwarranted. 88 Because government contracts can create third-party beneficiaries who share characteristics with both creditor beneficiaries and donee
beneficiaries, a formalistic view of the categories should not create an additional barrier to their recognition and does not justify special treatment of
their claims.
4.

The Government Is a Uniquely Unpredictable Contracting Partner

Finally, the government’s unreliable enforcement of contracts counsels
against a higher standard for recognizing third-party beneficiaries of its contracts. Because the government’s “intent” is particularly apt to change in light
of shifting political realities, allowing third-party beneficiaries to enforce the
contract may be the only way to ensure that the parties’ objectives at the time
of contract formation are actually carried out.
A principle of contract law is the quest to adopt default rules that reflect
what rational parties would have bargained for were they to have contemplated the rule when they formed the contract. 89 This idea assumes that a rational actor negotiating a contract would have agreed to remedies and rules
that would effectuate the objectives they had when they entered into the contract. 90
In many instances, this view of a rational actor with consistent objectives
does not map onto the government as a contracting party. For one, ascribing
a singular intent to any governmental action is notoriously hard. 91 By design,
the government’s intent changes as we change the government. 92 A government may contract for a benefit to be conveyed in the future, but come time
for performance, the government may no longer want that benefit conveyed.
And even where the government’s intent does not change, it may nonetheless lack the political will to demand performance. The government might,
for instance, recognize that it needs to extract a promise for the benefit of some
group for political purposes when it is forming the contract but then yield at

87. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1373–74 (“There are two well-established basic categories
of third-party beneficiaries who can enforce contracts.”).
88. Waters, supra note 15, at 1165–66 (discussing Corbin’s view that “limiting the recognition of third party rights to these categories was unwarranted”).
89. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1386–87.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (struggling with various sources of evidence to decipher the intent of a municipal body in making a
zoning decision).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (“[O]ne legislature
may not bind the legislative authority of its successors . . . .”).
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a later date to a more powerful political interest that does not want that promise performed. 93 Given that privatization most endangers politically marginalized citizens, 94 the government may less vigorously demand performance of
contracts that benefit the very people most reliant on those contracts.
This creates scenarios where the government may one day contract with
certain objectives to be fulfilled by performance, and then the next day change
its mind or lack an interest in demanding performance. This was the exact
dynamic that Professor Samuel Williston believed gave rise to the strongest
case for allowing a third-party beneficiary to enforce a contract. 95 Where the
promisee (here, the government) lacks an interest in demanding performance,
the case is strongest for allowing the third party who was the intended beneficiary of that performance to enforce the contract. 96 Otherwise, the contracting
parties’ initial intention is unlikely to be carried out. 97
The government’s unpredictability, and the greater likelihood that it will
not demand performance compared to private parties, also create a dynamic
in which parties contracting with the government may underbid, knowing
that they are less likely to face liability if they breach. 98 The inability of the
third-party beneficiary to enforce the contract creates an incentive for firms
to bid beneath the expected cost of performance and then breach. 99 They do
so knowing that they will likely escape liability for a breach but will win contracts because of lower bids. 100
II.

TOWARD AN EQUITABLE APPROACH

Not only is the application of a blanket heightened standard for recognizing third-party beneficiaries of government contracts unjustified, it also tugs
third-party beneficiary doctrine away from its equitable roots. Third-party
beneficiary doctrine was, from the beginning, concerned with the third party
itself and the unfairness of leaving it without a remedy when a promise made
for its benefit was broken. 101 Section 313 produces results that undermine the

93. See, e.g., Part III (discussing particular examples in Detroit, where the city government may not have vigorously sought performance of promises it extracted because that enforcement ran counter to the interests of politically powerful actors).
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
95. Samuel Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person., 15 HARV. L. REV. 767,
773–76 (1902).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures of Public–Private Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2257–58 (2013).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (dismissing the possibility that a
different result should be reached in the case because of technical contract doctrine when “manifest justice” demanded that the third-party beneficiary to the contract should have a remedy);
see also Williston, supra note 95, at 775 (“The denial of relief to a beneficiary is [as] obviously
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fairness concerns that animate third-party beneficiary doctrine 102 and offers
insufficient guidance for resolving the real questions that are particular to recognizing third party-beneficiaries of government contracts. 103 Proper guidance can come from an approach focused on answering the question that
originally gave rise to third-party beneficiary doctrine: is it fair to let this party
enforce the contract? Three inquiries with deep roots in third-party beneficiary cases can help answer that question. First, who benefits from performance of the contract? Second, will the party injured by nonperformance be
left with no remedy if denied third-party beneficiary status? And third, what
remedy is the would-be third-party beneficiary seeking?
A. Who Benefits from Performance?
The first consideration reframes the question courts answer when they
look to the intent of the contracting parties by instead asking: who benefits
from performance of the contract? Because of the difficulty with ascribing intent to the government, 104 courts should look less to the intent of the parties
and instead look to the structure of the contract itself. This approach is consistent with Williston’s rationale for allowing third-party claims in one category of case. 105 Williston identified a class of contracts that create a third-party
beneficiary because that party is the “sole beneficiary” of the contract. 106 Williston believed these were the cases where justice most strongly favored allowing the third-party beneficiary’s claim. 107 In determining when a contract
creates a “sole beneficiary,” Williston asked whether, after the contract is
formed, the promisee retains any pecuniary interest in its performance. 108 If
the promisee does not have a pecuniary interest, and the third party does, the

unsatisfactory in the case of life insurance policies [as in] . . . other contracts where the intention
of the promisee was to stipulate for a benefit to a third person.”).
102. See, e.g., Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline Sewer & Water, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 620
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (barring relief to a small business claiming it was a third-party beneficiary
of construction company’s promise to city government to maintain vehicle access at all times to
businesses affected by its sewer construction contract); Clifton v. Suburban Cable TV Co., 642
A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (leaving incarcerated people in Pennsylvania without remedy
when cable company increased their cable rates in breach of the cable company’s contract with
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections); Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1987)
(leaving applicants for federally subsidized low-income housing in the Chicago suburbs without
remedy when the developer decreased the percentage of subsidized units available in the building from the 40 percent it initially promised in its U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) contract to 20 percent).
103. See supra Sections I.B.2–4.
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by
Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2389 (2020).
105. See Williston, supra note 95, at 772–73 (naming “sole beneficiary” as one class of contracts in which third-party beneficiaries are created).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 772–76.
108. Id. at 772.
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third party is best understood as the “sole beneficiary” of the contract, meaning it is fair and necessary to let the third party enforce the contract. 109
Williston’s approach deemphasizes the intent of the parties and instead
asks: who stands to gain what from the performance of this contract? This is
the right approach with government contracts for three reasons.
First, it shifts the inquiry away from the classical categories of donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries. The “sole beneficiaries” with whom Williston was concerned were those beneficiaries that many courts—and the First
Restatement—came to describe as donee beneficiaries. 110 This slippage of language from sole beneficiaries to donee beneficiaries causes confusion in the
government context. 111 As Williston explained, the rationale for allowing
third-party claims in these types of cases is not that the benefit was intended
as a gift but rather that only the third-party beneficiary has a pecuniary interest in performance. 112 By refocusing on who has a strong pecuniary interest in
performance, courts can avoid some of the confusion that has resulted from
applying donee beneficiary and creditor beneficiary categories to government
contracts.
Second, Williston’s approach helps courts focus on the appropriate thirdparty beneficiary of any given contract. The “sole beneficiary” analysis involves the same difficult line drawing questions that concerned Chief Judge
Cardozo in Moch. 113 But this approach aligns courts’ analyses in these cases
with the same line drawing analysis that must be done in all third-party beneficiary cases: a focus on who stands to benefit from the contract. 114

109. Id. at 772–75. It is necessary because failure to allow them to enforce the agreement
makes it unlikely the objectives of the contracting parties would be carried out. Id.
110. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1932). For example,
Williston includes Buchanan v. Tilden in his list of cases where recovery was allowed by the sole
beneficiary. Williston, supra note 95, at 804. That case provided the doctrinal underpinnings for
Seaver v. Ransom, which was a New York case decided sixteen years after Williston published
his article. 120 N.E. 639, 641 (N.Y. 1918). Seaver is often cited as the quintessential donee beneficiary case as the Restatement named this category of case. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 18, at
1371.
111. See supra Section I.B.3.
112. Williston, supra note 95, at 772–75.
113. See supra Section I.B.1.
114. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. For an example of a court undertaking
this sort of line drawing analysis in relation to a government contract, see Price v. Pierce, 823
F.2d 1114, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1987) (deciding that prospective tenants of federally subsidized
housing did not have standing to enforce their prospective landlords’ contracts with HUD, in
contrast with current tenants who did).
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And third, it avoids trying to identify a singular intent behind the government’s decision to contract. 115 That analysis raises all sorts of difficult questions, 116 and if it can be avoided while applying a test consistent with thirdparty beneficiary doctrine, it ought to be. Asking who stands to benefit from
performance, rather than who the government intends to benefit, accomplishes that.
B. Will the Injured Party Seeking Third-Party Beneficiary Status Be Left
Without a Remedy If That Status Is Denied?
After looking at the structure of the contract to decide if the plaintiff was
the sole beneficiary of its performance, courts should ask if that plaintiff would
be left without a remedy if they could not enforce the contract. The desire to
avoid leaving the third party without a remedy is at the very heart of thirdparty beneficiary doctrine. It was exactly this concern that led the court to
grant third-party beneficiary status to the plaintiff in Lawrence. 117
The court was aware that Lawrence would not have a legal remedy to seek
the underlying gambling debt from Hawley. 118 If the court did not allow Lawrence to recover as a third-party beneficiary, Lawrence would have no way to
collect the money. The court was undeterred, writing that if “it could be shown
that a more strict and technically accurate application of the rules . . . would
lead to a different result[,] . . . the effort should not be made in the face of
manifest justice.” 119
Courts should similarly be loath to leave a party for whom the government contracted to benefit with no remedy if that benefit is not conveyed.
Courts too often dismiss this concern as beyond the scope of their role in determining if a third-party beneficiary can enforce the contract. 120
This inquiry can also resolve an area of particular sensitivity in relation to
government contracts: whether recognizing a third-party beneficiary will undermine the will of a democratic body. Government contracts can take on a
“dual character as both contract-like instruments and public lawmaking instruments.” 121 Because the contract can be used by governments as a “lawmaking instrument,” courts should hesitate to recognize third-party beneficiaries
where doing so would directly undermine the democratic will under which
115. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Fahey, supra note 104, at 2389 (“If
third-party rights do stem from the agreement, whose intent determines third-party-beneficiary
status?” (italics omitted)).
116. Fahey, supra note 104, at 2389. See generally LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L.
RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 324–26 (3d ed. 2020).
117. For a discussion of the facts in the case, see supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
118. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 268 (1859); see also Waters, supra note 15, at 1127.
119. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 275.
120. E.g., Clifton v. Suburban Cable TV Co., 642 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (denying third-party beneficiary status and noting that it was “beyond the purview of this appeal” to
ask why the state was not enforcing the terms of the contract).
121. Fahey, supra note 104, at 2330.
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the contract was formed. This concern is most salient and likely to dictate the
result where the contract is made pursuant to a statute that prescribes enforcement of the contract’s substantive obligations. 122
Courts can be sensitive to this dynamic by considering the availability of
other remedies to the plaintiff. Where a democratic body has expressly provided an enforcement mechanism through which the plaintiff can seek performance, allowing the third-party beneficiary to sue would undermine that
mechanism. The availability of another remedy would also weaken the plaintiff’s claim that equity requires they enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary. And any undermining of the democratically devised scheme would
be avoided.
In Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, for example, Santa Clara
County sought damages for breach by Astra and other pharmaceutical companies of their contractual obligation to provide drugs for a price less than
what they charged the county. 123 The county claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the federal government and the companies,
which capped the price the drug companies could charge. 124
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the county’s argument that it
was a third-party beneficiary. 125 The Court noted that the statute establishing
the drug price caps did not create a private right of action for overcharged
providers to bring claims directly against the drug companies and instead provided an administrative enforcement mechanism through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). 126 The county could complain
to the HRSA, which could require an overcharging drug manufacturer to reimburse the county. 127 The Court made particular note that Congress had recently passed a new law directing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services to “develop formal procedures” for these complaints, whereby the secretary will “reach an ‘administrative resolution’ that is
subject to judicial review.”128 As such, County of Santa Clara does not suggest
that a third-party beneficiary has another remedy if their only recourse is to
lobby political actors to enforce a contract more vigorously. Instead, it means
that the equitable case for a third-party beneficiary claim is weaker where a
formal adjudicative remedial procedure is available. 129
122. E.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty. 563 U.S. 110 (2011) (giving controlling importance to the fact that the contracts under which the third-party beneficiary sought to sue were
made pursuant to a statute that provided other remedies).
123. Id. at 116.
124. Id. at 117.
125. Id. at 110.
126. Id. at 117, 121–22.
127. Id. at 115.
128. Id. at 116.
129. Contra Cooper v. Charter Commc’ns Ents. I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2014)
(“[I]n situations in which an elected local government holds enforcement power, citizens can
seek recourse by acting through the political process to cause the municipality to seek a remedy . . . .”).
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C. What Remedy Is the Plaintiff Seeking?
Considering the form of remedy sought can also help courts decide if a
plaintiff is a sole beneficiary with the right sort of relationship to the contract.
Where the plaintiff is seeking restitution or specific performance, they are
more likely to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract. This is consistent
with one strand of third-party beneficiary cases from Lawrence onward. 130 In
these cases, breach by the promisor equated to holding money that should belong to the beneficiary. 131 In Lawrence, Fox was essentially holding money
from Hawley that belonged in Lawrence’s hands. 132 In a more recent case that
involved a government contract, Zigas v. Superior Court of San Francisco, the
plaintiffs demanded rents collected by their landlord in excess of the maximum amount the landlord had promised to charge in its agreement with the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 133 The landlord had already collected the excess rent, and the tenants sought return of
that money. 134
Where that dynamic exists, the plaintiffs are asking for the promise to be
performed by demanding restitution of the money they lost because of the
breach. This dynamic can exist even where the parties have not lost money
but instead have been denied the benefits of a public program and are seeking
injunctive relief demanding access to those benefits. 135 Where a plaintiff seeks
specific performance or restitution, the doctrine most strongly demands they
be recognized as third-party beneficiaries to the contract. 136
Considering the form of damages sought as an equitable factor responds
to Cardozo’s concerns in Moch of spiraling liability from the very nature of
government contracts. 137 Where the plaintiffs will be made whole by the performance of the contract, or the transfer of assets they have lost directly because of the breach, they are more likely to be a member of “identifiable
classes . . . for whose particular benefit” the government has exacted a promise
from the defendant. 138
By contrast, where the plaintiff seeks consequential damages, courts
might look more closely to ensure that they do not expose the promisor to
unforeseen, unlimited liability. Section 313 reflects this concern, providing
130. See Waters, supra note 15, at 1191.
131. See id.
132. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
133. 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
134. Id.
135. Waters, supra note 15, at 1204–06; see, e.g., Hook v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 972 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1992) (where third-party beneficiary plaintiffs were denied access to their mail as
promised in a consent decree).
136. Williston, supra note 95, at 773–76 (contending that denying a party standing to seek
performance as a third-party beneficiary is most unjust in those situations where the “only satisfactory relief is something in the nature of specific performance”).
137. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
138. Waters, supra note 15, at 1204.
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that the contracting party is not liable to “a member of the public for consequential damages” unless the heightened standard of section 313(2) is satisfied. 139 But courts too often apply this heightened standard even where the
plaintiff seeks restitutionary or equitable damages. 140
This is not to say that no plaintiff seeking consequential damages should
have third-party beneficiary standing. But akin to the general rule for consequential damages, 141 where it was not foreseeable to the government and party
it contracted with that this plaintiff would suffer this sort of harm from breach,
it is far less likely that the plaintiff is the sole beneficiary of the contract.
In Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline Sewer & Water, Inc., 142 for example, a Wisconsin court denied a small business’s claim that it was a thirdparty beneficiary of a construction company’s promise to a city government
to maintain vehicle access at all times for businesses affected by its construction. 143 Because the construction company breached that provision of its contract, the business lost profits during construction. 144 The court acknowledged
that the provision of the contract requiring vehicle access did evince an intent
to benefit parties like this business. 145 Yet the court held that, because the
plaintiff sought economic damages resulting from the breach, rather than injunctive relief, the lack of an express contractual provision making the construction company liable for damages to parties like the plaintiff meant the
business did not satisfy section 313. 146
The court, by inquiring about the form of damages sought and the beneficiary of the contract’s vehicle access term, was identifying who was and was
not a sole beneficiary of the contract. Applying section 313 served only to shift
the court’s attention away from that question. The court’s analysis would have
been more responsive to the doctrine’s concerns had it simply asked if the
third party’s consequential damages were foreseeable at the time of contracting. In doing so, the court might have avoided the strange result of holding

139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307–10 (D.
Mass. 2010) (applying § 313 but excluding the “consequential damages” language to a claim
where plaintiffs sought rescission of the sale of their home and injunctive relief).
141. See Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.) (establishing the doctrine of
foreseeability for consequential damages: “Where two parties have made a contract which one
of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach
of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”).
142. 605 N.W.2d 620 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
143. Sussex Tool & Supply, 605 N.W.2d 620.
144. Id. at 622.
145. Id. at 625–26.
146. See id. at 626.
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that a business denied vehicular access to its property was not the sole beneficiary of a promise to “provide vehicular access at all times to the properties
affected by this project.” 147
Where the plaintiff will be made whole either by specific performance or
restitution, courts should be assured that the plaintiff is a sole beneficiary under third-party beneficiary doctrine. Where plaintiffs seek consequential
damages instead, courts should ask if those damages were foreseeable to determine if the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary. This analysis, more so than
section 313, recognizes plaintiffs with the right relationship to government
contracts while also responding to concerns about spiraling liability.
III. THE EQUITABLE APPROACH APPLIED IN DETROIT
The importance of reviving an equitable approach to these claims is clear
when considering the contemporary landscape of privatization. We all rely on
government contracts to deliver basic services and benefits. Private partners
contracting with the government deliver water, education, roads, parking meters, public transit, healthcare, and more. 148 Contract law should be prepared
to enforce the terms of those contracts made for our benefit.
Two contracts at the center of recent efforts to stimulate Detroit’s economy, and at the center of considerable political controversy, illustrate how the
equitable principles outlined in this Note can produce results truer to the
third-party beneficiary doctrine’s purpose. Detroit is a fitting landscape in
which to examine the need for and promise of an equitable approach. In the
wake of decades of divestment, racist public policy, and economic decline, the
city and state government have frequently turned to public–private partnerships as an effort to address the city’s challenges. 149 And many engaged organizers, activists, and citizens have sought to monitor, push back on, and

147. Id. at 622.
148. See IN THE PUB. INT., supra note 9, at 2; Brian Alexander, Privatization Is Changing
America’s Relationship with Its Physical Stuff, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/infrastructure-private-public-partnerships/533256 [perma.cc/
TF6U-NJAQ]; Ben Tarnoff, How Privatization Could Spell the End of Democracy, GUARDIAN (June
21, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/21/privatizing-publicservices-trump-democracy [perma.cc/L59Y-AXJR].
149. See, e.g., Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Detroit Once Tried to Privatize Public Health. Now
It’s Trying to Rebuild, NPR (Aug. 6, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2021/08/06/1024933341/detroit-public-health-privatize-covid-bankruptcy [perma.cc/A5GAHMTE]; Josiah Rector, Neoliberalism’s Deadly Experiment, JACOBIN (Oct. 21, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/10/water-detroit-flint-emergency-management-lead-snyderprivatization [perma.cc/8724-PW27] (“Since 2000, state-appointed emergency managers in Detroit . . . have outsourced key functions of their water departments to private companies . . . .”);
Olivia Lewis, Public–Private Partnerships Fueling Detroit’s Neighborhood Comebacks, BRIDGE
DETROIT (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.bridgedetroit.com/public-private-partnerships-fueling-detroits-neighborhood-comebacks [perma.cc/LT4R-YT5X].
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influence those partnerships to ensure they are actually benefiting Detroiters. 150 As a result, it is an environment where you might expect to find a
number of potential third-party beneficiary claims to government contracts
and where treating those claims equitably might go some way to empowering
citizens impacted by privatization.
A. The Little Caesars Arena Deal
In September 2017, Little Caesars Arena opened in Detroit. 151 Over $320
million of public money funded the new home of the Pistons and the Red
Wings. 152 In exchange for public funding, the arena’s owner, Olympia Development of Michigan (ODM), and its concessionaire, Olympia Development
of Michigan Events Center (ODMEC), made a series of contractual promises
about how the stadium would be built, what would be invested in the areas
surrounding the arena, and who would be employed in constructing and operating the arena. 153 ODM and ODMEC made those contracts with the City
of Detroit Downtown Development Authority, an agency created by state statute and governed by a board appointed by Detroit’s mayor. 154

150. See e.g., Ashley Bohrer, “Privatization Is Not the Solution”: Michigan Activists Fight for
Water Justice, IN THESE TIMES (July 15, 2015), https://inthesetimes.com/article/michigan-activists-march-70-miles-for-water-justice [perma.cc/JX5Y-MRLB]; Kris Hamel, Detroit Activists
Say ‘No’ to Capitalist World Economic Forum, LIBERATION (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.liberationnews.org/detroit-activists-say-no-to-capitalist-world-economic-forum-2 [perma.cc/LGS58898].
151. John Gallagher, Behind the Scenes, 30 Years of Hard Work Led to Opening of Little
Caesars Arena, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 4, 2017, 10:04 PM), https://www.freep.com/
story/money/2017/09/04/timeline-little-caesars-arena-ilitch-hockey-detroit/597623001 [perma.cc
/D7AD-6RCW].
152. Violet Ikonomova, Little Caesars Arena Cost Creeps Toward Billion Dollar Mark,
DETROIT METRO TIMES (May 23, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news/little-caesars-arena-cost-creeps-toward-billion-dollar-mark-3883134 [perma.cc/J985-QSSV]. Since opening, the arena has received an additional $74 million in Detroit taxpayer money for satisfying
certain obligations for “ancillary development” around the arena. JC Reindl, Ilitch Organization
to Get $74M Bonus for Hitting Arena District Goal, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 11, 2019, 5:51 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/2019/05/11/ilitch-organization-arena-detroit-district-goal-bonus/1157439001 [perma.cc/B4SP-ZPXJ]. This level of public funding for a new
arena is not unique to Detroit and Little Caesars Arena. See, e.g., Jon Sanders, THE JOHN LOCKE
FOUND., Publicly Funded Stadiums, in NORTH CAROLINA POLICY SOLUTIONS 185, 185–89 (2022),
https://www.johnlocke.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Policy-Solutions-2022-John-LockeFoundation-1.pdf [perma.cc/EHJ9-4Q9H] (documenting public financing of NFL stadiums
around the country).
153. Fifth Amendment to Master Development and Reimbursement Agreement (EC Ancillary Development Project) by and Between City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority and Olympia Development of Michigan, L.L.C. (June 4, 2019) (on file with author); Fifth
Amendment to Amended and Restated Concession and Management Agreement (May 30,
2019) [hereinafter CMA] (on file with author).
154. What Is the Downtown Development Authority?, DETROIT ECON. GROWTH CORP.,
https://www.degc.org/dda [perma.cc/USW5-D7TF].
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Citizen watchdogs and media have heavily critiqued the wisdom of
providing this public funding. 155 They have also pointed out that the promises
that were specifically made to benefit Detroiters (however limited they may
have been) have been broken. 156 Contractors building the stadium failed to
ensure that their workforce was made up of at least 51 percent Detroiters, as
promised. 157 Furthermore, there is an open question of whether the arena’s
concessionaire has satisfied its obligations to hire the agreed-upon percentage
of Detroiters for its estimated 1,100 jobs or to instate programs “to maximize . . . opportunities to hire and promote Detroit residents” and purchase
goods and services from Detroit businesses. 158
Political dynamics may have contributed to the city’s failure to demand
performance of these promises, showing why third-party beneficiary claims
are necessary. Companies owned by the Ilitch family, the owner and operator
of ODM and ODMEC, control 60 percent of the properties in the central business district near the arena. 159 Those properties account for 83.8 acres, more
than all of downtown Detroit. 160 The family’s companies are the fourth largest
employer in the city. 161 The venues they own attract more than 10 million visitors annually, and they own two of the city’s professional sports teams. 162 All
that is to say that the Ilitch family is a politically powerful stakeholder, and,
for better or worse, the city might not be inclined to go to battle with them
over broken promises.
Should the people who were meant to benefit from those promises be able
to battle where the city government will not? Applying the equitable factors
155. See, e.g., Nancy Derringer, Amid Mass Media Flattery, a Sharp-Edge Ilitch Critic
Emerges on Facebook, DEADLINE DETROIT (Nov. 7, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/20968/amid_mass_media_flattery_a_sharp-edge_ilitch_critic_emerges
_on_facebook [perma.cc/HGY2-WYHR]; Tom Perkins, The Ilitches Want Even More Taxpayer
Money for District Detroit, METRO TIMES (May 21, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news/shameless-the-ilitches-want-even-more-taxpayer-money-for-district-detroit-21700917 [perma.cc/Q4KN-JYUP]; Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel (HBO television
broadcast Apr. 23, 2019).
156. See Louis Aguilar, LCA Contractors Fined $2.9M over Detroit Hires, DETROIT NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2017, 8:29 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/08/
23/little-caesars-arena-construction-fines/104902524 [perma.cc/EXD9-S3A9] (discussing failure
of contractors building Little Caesars Arena to meet their obligation to employ at least 51 percent
Detroiters during construction).
157. Id.
158. Letter from David Whitaker, Dir., Detroit City Council Legis. Pol’y Div., to Detroit
City Council (Sept. 29, 2021), https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/202109/LPD%20Report%20on%20District%20Detroit%20Development%20Committment%20Upd
ate.pdf [perma.cc/96RD-LRXY].
159. Louis Aguilar, District Detroit: Inside the Ilitches’ Land of Unfilled Promises, DETROIT
NEWS (May 23, 2019, 3:51 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2019/05/22/ilitch-companies-control-district-detroit-area-land-larger-than-downtown/
2636965002 [perma.cc/Q6PY-E4J7].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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outlined in this Note might yield different results for those hurt by the nonperformance of the different employment promises. 163
1.

The Construction Contractors’ Failure to Hire Enough Detroiters

When ODMEC contracted with the city, it knew that satisfying its promise to employ at least 51 percent Detroiters in the arena construction workforce would be a challenge, if not impossible. 164 Indeed, a very limited number
of contractors satisfied the obligation. 165 All told, Detroit residents performed
only 25 percent of the almost 3 million hours worked on the project. 166
ODMEC and its contractors explained the failure by citing a lack of skilled
trade workers living in the city. 167 But there were at least some skilled trade
workers in Detroit who were available to work on the project but were not
hired. 168
These workers could argue that they were third-party beneficiaries of the
term that each contractor would “take positive action to ensure” that Detroit
residents made up at least 51 percent of the workforce. 169 Applying the equitable considerations outlined in this Note should lead a court to grant them
standing as third-party beneficiaries. By contrast, a court applying section 313
would likely deny their claim. 170

163. Professor Patience A. Crowder has persuasively argued that § 313 is not applicable to
these sorts of urban “redevelopment contracts” because they are not contracts to benefit a “large
and indeterminate public.” Crowder, supra note 12, at 318 (emphasis omitted). While this Note
is consistent with Crowder’s argument, it goes further in arguing that § 313 is generally wrongheaded and therefore considers these contracts under the rubric of equitable factors proposed
here as a replacement for § 313.
164. See Jake Neher, Bait and Switch? Little Caesars Arena Falls Short on Detroit Workers,
WDET (Aug. 28, 2017), https://wdet.org/posts/2017/08/28/85685-bait-and-switch-little-caesarsarena-falls-short-on-detroit-workers [perma.cc/75TL-CN3F] (“Everybody knew you couldn’t get
to 51 percent . . . .”).
165. Id.
166. Kim Slowey, Local Hire Fines for Detroit Arena Contractors Climb to $5.2M, CONSTR.
DIVE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.constructiondive.com/news/local-hire-fines-for-detroit-arenacontractors-climb-to-52m/519688 [perma.cc/YQB4-9NHB].
167. Neher, supra note 164.
168. See, e.g., Complaint at 8, Wilson v. Hardman Constr., Inc., No. 5:18-cv-10431 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 6, 2018) (“During the months of April and May when Hardman gave Wilson [a bona
fide Detroit resident] the run around, the Company had over $41,000 in recruitment fees because
only 7 and 3 percent of the hours worked on the project had been by residents of the City of
Detroit.”).
169. CMA, supra note 153, at Exhibit I-3.
170. The liquidated damages provision inuring to the benefit of the government in the
CMA would likely lead a court applying § 313 to err against treating these workers as third-party
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 521 P.2d 841, 846 (Cal. 1974) (denying a thirdparty beneficiary claim because the contract included a liquidated damages provision inuring to
the benefit of the government); see also, e.g., infra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
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The damages clause of the contract suggests that eligible workers are the
sole beneficiaries of the term. The contract provides “Non-Compliance Remedies” for failure to hit the 51 percent mark. 171 If the contractors breached
their promise, the city would receive support in addressing the macro-conditions that led to the breach by requiring the contractors to pay money or provide in-kind contributions to programs to train new skilled trade workers.172
In that sense, the city had little or no pecuniary interest in the performance of
the promise. It was interested in the macro benefit of the creation of economic
opportunity, and because the remedy for breach would provide funds to train
new workers through apprenticeships, it would receive that benefit even if the
contractors breached. 173 The city may have even preferred receiving the funding to train new workers. Therefore, the workers who were prepared to fill
jobs on the construction project had the strongest pecuniary interest in the
performance of the promise that would see them receive those jobs.
The damages clause similarly sheds light on the second of the equitable
factors: whether these already-qualified workers would be left without a remedy. Because the training programs were designed to train new skilled trade
workers, 174 existing skilled trade workers who did not receive jobs would have
no remedy for the breach. 175 Both the sole-beneficiary analysis and inquiry
into the availability of other remedies make clear that Detroit’s existing qualified skilled trade workers were the intended beneficiaries of the promise to
employ at least 51 percent Detroiters. They should have standing as thirdparty beneficiaries to seek damages for breach of that promise.
2.

The Concessionaire’s Failure to Employ and Train Enough Detroiters

The other possible third-party beneficiary claims, based on promises to
employ a certain percentage of Detroiters in the arena’s concession operations
and to provide certain training programs, are not as strong as the claim by the
qualified, skilled trade workers. Here, the sole-beneficiary analysis does not
favor the potential employees as strongly as it does above. As outlined, the city
does have a strong pecuniary interest in economic opportunity produced by

171. CMA, supra note 153, at Exhibit I-16.
172. Id. at Exhibit I-16–17.
173. See Sarah Cwiek, It’s Go Time for Little Caesar’s Arena and “District Detroit”, MICH.
RADIO (Sept. 5, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.michiganradio.org/news/2017-09-05/its-go-time-forlittle-caesars-arena-and-district-detroit [perma.cc/S7RL-V529] (“City Council President Brenda
Jones said everyday Detroit residents deserve some return on that investment. ‘Everyone knows
what was important to me is when you’re spending taxpayers’ dollars, you give something back
to the city,’ she said. Jones believes the city is getting something back, in the form of jobs and
skilled trades apprenticeships for Detroiters.”).
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. Contra Martinez, 521 P.2d at 846 (deeming the contract’s inclusion of a liquidated
damages provision providing that damages for failure to provide the promised jobs would be
paid to the government as evidence that the government and company did not manifest an intention to create third-party beneficiaries in the contract).
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the stadium. 176 Because the city is not guaranteed funding to create additional
economic opportunity if the arena breaches those ongoing promises, the city
can only secure the benefit it is interested in by demanding performance. 177
These claims may turn on the line drawing analysis the sole-beneficiary
inquiry helps guide. 178 If the person claiming to be a third-party beneficiary
were a person who either worked at or tried to work at the arena and lost or
was denied employment because of ODMEC’s failure to perform, they have a
strong pecuniary interest in the performance of the contract. Unlike the city,
whose interest in performance is macroeconomic and disconnected from individual hiring or firing actions, this worker’s entire pecuniary interest in the
contract turns on ODMEC’s performance of its employment promise. The
same would be true of an employee denied the benefit of promised training
opportunities. By contrast, an individual who never applied for employment
would have only the same sort of macroeconomic interest in performance that
the city has and, as such, does not have a stronger pecuniary interest in performance than the city. 179
B. Detroit Land Bank Authority Contracts
Another program central to Detroit’s plans for economic growth that
raises possible third-party beneficiary issues is the Detroit Land Bank Authority. The Detroit Land Bank Authority (the “Authority”) was created in 2008 180
and is authorized by the 2003 Land Bank Fast Track Act. 181 Land banks take
control of properties held by cities, most often in their possession because of
tax foreclosure, and either demolish dilapidated properties or sell properties
for rehabilitation and use. 182

176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
177. CMA, supra note 153, at 22.2 (outlining ODMEC promises to make “commercially
reasonable efforts” to “recruit qualified Detroit residents[,] . . . provide internal or external development and training opportunities[, and offer other] . . . promotion[al] opportunities”).
178. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
179. Cf. Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987) (deciding that prospective tenants of federally subsidized housing did not have standing to enforce their prospective landlord’s
contracts with HUD, in contrast with current tenants who did).
180. John Gallagher, Detroit Land Bank Notches Many Wins Including 10,000 Side-Lot
Sales, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 23, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/john-gallagher/2018/09/23/detroit-land-bank/1358663002 [perma.cc/UBN8-YZC2].
181. Land Bank Fast Track Act, No. 258, 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts 1357 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 124.751–.774).
182. Erick Trickey, Detroit’s DIY Cure for Urban Blight, POLITICO MAG. (May 18, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/18/how-detroit-is-beating-its-blight-215160
[perma.cc/HZ8H-KEWG] (“Land banks are the Swiss Army knives of urban reclamation efforts . . . .”).
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The Authority is the largest land bank in the country. 183 At one point, it
owned around 20 percent of single-family homes in Detroit. 184 Its size is the
product of a confluence of conditions, including the shrinking population of
the city over the past half century, macroeconomic conditions affecting the
city, the subprime mortgage crisis, and overassessment of home values (which
led to inflated taxes owners could not afford to pay). 185 The high number of
vacant properties in the city contributes to and results from some of the most
significant challenges the city and its residents face, including declining homeownership, 186 a declining population and tax base, 187 and the presence of speculators. 188 The Authority is constituted to address the complicated problem of
these blighted and vacant properties and to eventually return them “to productive use.” 189
One of the key tools that the Authority leverages to accomplish this mission is the sale of homes through auction or its “Own It Now” program. 190
When a buyer purchases a home through one of these programs, they sign a
Purchase & Development Agreement including covenants that the buyer will
rehabilitate the home and “provide proof that the Property is renovated and
occupied” within 180 days of closing. 191
Some residents have complained that purchasers of Authority properties
have failed to renovate and occupy the homes within 180 days, as they are
contractually required to do. 192 In a high-profile example, current Michigan
183. Id.
184. Sarah Alvarez & Leah Samuel, Real Estate Is Hot in Detroit. But Its Top Owner, the
City, Isn’t Selling., BRIDGE MICH. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.bridgemi.com/urban-affairs/real-estate-hot-detroit-its-top-owner-city-isnt-selling [perma.cc/74CP-3SGX].
185. Id.; Gallagher, supra note 180; Aaron Mondry, Property Values Are Rising. But These
Longtime Detroiters Say They Are Missing Out Because of the Land Bank., OUTLIER MEDIA (Aug.
11, 2021), https://outliermedia.org/property-values-are-rising-but-these-longtime-detroiters-saythey-are-missing-out-because-of-the-land-bank [perma.cc/M5QM-BWXE].
186. Alvarez & Samuel, supra note 184 (“Detroit has gone from having one of the nation’s
best rates for black homeownership to being a majority-renter city.”).
187. Trickey, supra note 182.
188. See Gallagher, supra note 180 (discussing how a similar dynamic with speculators
purchasing foreclosed properties in Flint led to the creation of the Genesee County Land Bank
Authority).
189. Policies & Procedures, DETROIT LAND BANK AUTH., https://buildingdetroit.org/our-policies [perma.cc/8WLS-GTRR]; Trickey, supra note 182 (“[Mayor Duggan] wanted to bring people back into the city, increase the tax rolls and save Detroit . . . . One of the keys to his plan was
to radically enlarge the city’s tiny land bank program.”).
190. Tom Perkins, The Detroit Land Bank and Its Many Controversies, Explained, CURBED
DETROIT (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:02 AM), https://detroit.curbed.com/2020/4/30/21166791/detroit-landbank-authority-vacant-house-for-sale [perma.cc/D4KK-RCZN].
191. Purchase & Development Agreement, App. 1 [hereinafter Purchase Agreement] (on
file with author).
192. Katlyn Alo, Detroit Land Bank Oversight at Issue as Neighbors Complain of Poor Upkeep,
DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 14, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2020/02/13/detroit-land-bank-oversight-issue-amid-complaints-poor-upkeep/4592183002
[perma.cc/6HT3-D67H].
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Lieutenant Governor Garlin Gilchrist purchased a property from the Authority in 2016 for $13,500 and then failed to renovate and occupy it by the 180day deadline, prompting complaints from neighbors that became a scandal in
the 2018 gubernatorial election. 193
The Authority’s current director has acknowledged issues with clarity
around its compliance program. 194 But what are Detroit residents to do when
homes in their neighborhood were sold to buyers who never renovated and
occupied them? Detroiters living near these homes may have plausible claims
for breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries.
Applying the equitable approach, courts can be responsive to the individual plaintiff’s relationship to the contract and the Authority’s enforcement
mechanisms. Rather than applying a blanket presumption against recognizing
third-party beneficiaries to these government contracts—which would likely
bar any claim—the equitable approach would help to distinguish long-term
residents from speculative purchasers. It would also allow the court to be sensitive to the Authority’s actual enforcement of Purchase Agreements, ensuring
that the third party does not interfere with the function of the government
program, while prohibiting unaccountable actors from making empty promises and leaving residents with no remedy for the breach.
A court should first ask who stands to benefit from performance of the
renovation and occupancy term of the contract. The Authority is interested in
distributing houses in its possession so that they can be put to productive
use. 195 The Authority’s pecuniary interest in performance is therefore weakened, but not extinguished, once they transfer the property. They have satisfied the inventory reduction aspect of their mission simply by selling the house
(and have already received their compensation for the sale). But, insofar as the
Authority has an interest in ensuring properties are actually put to productive
use (both because it is a mandate of their mission, and perhaps more tangibly
because it will impact future funding), they do retain a pecuniary interest in
the performance of this promise.
Despite this residual pecuniary interest, the Authority’s incentive to demand performance is diminished by the unappealing nature of their available
remedies. The remedies provision of the contract provides that the Authority
can, in the case of breach, retain the purchase price as liquidated damages
while reclaiming ownership of the property. 196 Because the Authority has a

193. Id.; Gilchrist Selling Troubled Detroit Apartment Building, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019,
9:25 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2019/01/31/gilchrist-detroit-property/38983547 [perma.cc/V2GE-KV7X]. The Lieutenant Governor eventually sold the
property in 2019 for $190,000, but only after, according to his statements to the Land Bank Authority, he spent $225,798.90 repairing it. Id.; Ed White, Garlin Gilchrist Selling Troubled Detroit
Apartment Building, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan 31. 2019, 3:55 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/detroit/2019/01/31/garlin-gilchrist-detroit-apartment-building/2735513002
[perma.cc/5DMW-SKWZ].
194. Perkins, supra note 190.
195. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
196. Purchase Agreement, supra note 191, at § 12.

320

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:291

strong interest in not reclaiming properties they have already sold (“Occupancy is the goal—we don’t want to take those houses back at all . . . .”), 197 their
pecuniary interest may actually cut against seeking performance of the buyer’s
obligations. This is even more salient when the buyers have political or economic power that might influence the Authority’s actions. 198
By contrast, the neighbors of properties purchased from the Authority do
have a strong pecuniary interest in performance. Their property values and
quality of life are tied to the improvement of the properties in their neighborhoods. 199 This equitable consideration should at least make a court seriously
consider a neighbor as a valid third-party beneficiary.
The second and third considerations posited in this Note help guide an
inquiry into the actual enforcement processes at the Authority and draw out
the distinctions between long-time resident plaintiffs and speculator plaintiffs.
Asking whether the neighbor will be left with no other remedy should
they be denied third-party beneficiary status requires an inquiry into the Authority’s enforcement mechanism. The Authority has a compliance team
tasked with ensuring that property owners renovate their purchased properties. 200 Although the Authority does not provide an explicit process for filing
complaints if a neighbor is not in compliance, it does provide a general contact
number. 201 Notably, neither the statute that authorizes the creation of land
banks, nor the Intergovernmental Agreement between the City of Detroit and
Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority (which contractually creates the
Authority), speaks to any reporting or enforcement mechanism for citizens
aggrieved by the Authority’s failure to ensure compliance with purchase
agreements. 202
To know whether these plaintiffs would be left without remedy requires
an inquiry into how the Authority accepts and responds to citizen compliance

197. Perkins, supra note 190 (quoting Saskia Thompson, Director, Detroit Land Bank Authority).
198. Lieutenant Governor Gilchrist is an example of one such buyer. Charlie LeDuff, Screw
You, Detroit! Garlin Gilchrist Lets House Go to Hell, DEADLINE DETROIT (Oct. 12, 2018, 10:21 AM),
https://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/20797/leduff_screw_you_detroit_whitmer_s_pick_
lets_house_go_to_hell [perma.cc/DK55-VCFU]. But this example is certainly not unique, nor
perhaps of the sort that is most concerning or pervasive. The Authority also sells to developers
who own large numbers of properties and may have political influence and power that makes
the Authority hesitant to vigorously enforce compliance. See, e.g., Aaron Mondry, Core City Developer Outlines Grand Plans for District, CURBED DETROIT (Feb. 18, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://detroit.
curbed.com/2020/2/18/21142560/core-city-detroit-philip-kafka-true-north [perma.cc/5MUUR6CT].
199. See, e.g., Alo, supra note 192.
200. Compliance, DETROIT LAND BANK AUTH., https://buildingdetroit.org/compliance
[perma.cc/9SS3-CST7].
201. Id.
202. Land Bank Fast Track Act, No. 258, 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts 1357 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 124.751–.774); Second Amended and Restated Intergovernmental Agreement
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/dlba-production-bucket/cms/IGA+-+2nd
+Amended+EXECUTED+121913.pdf [perma.cc/MK7N-UR2A].
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complaints in practice. If a plaintiff can show that the Authority is not receptive, the court should err toward recognizing the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary. But, if the court believes there are administrative remedies in place,
the court should hesitate to grant third-party beneficiary status. In that case,
the equities weigh against the plaintiff. And looking into the availability of
other remedies ensures the court does not undercut a good faith enforcement
scheme administered by a representative body. 203 The absence of any enforcement scheme indicates the court is not undercutting a democratic design but
instead is allowing the third-party beneficiary to seek performance where no
adequate enforcement mechanism exists.
Also salient here is the fact that the Authority is free to grant extensions
to purchasers who request more time to complete renovations. Those owners,
in turn, are not in breach of their contracts when they fail to complete the
renovation within 180 days of purchase. 204 This too ensures that third-party
beneficiaries are not bringing claims that undercut the administration of the
program, as the Authority can grant extensions where it deems necessary. This
shows that, despite Cardozo’s fears in Moch, 205 courts need not restrict thirdparty beneficiary claims to prevent rising costs that dissuade parties from contracting with the government. As the Authority has done, parties can structure
contracts to avoid placing the promisor in breach where the government
knows it wants to provide flexibility. The Authority may know buyers will not
purchase these homes without the flexibility of deadline extensions and can
act accordingly. The rights of third-party beneficiaries need not be diminished.
Finally, looking at the form of remedy sought helps distinguish plaintiffs
who should have third-party beneficiary standing from those who should not.
Even for long-term residents who have houses in their neighborhoods sold by
the Authority, their damages are consequential. They seek the lost “profits”
(the increased property values) that would have resulted from the purchaser
meeting their renovation requirements. This weakens their third-party beneficiary claim but does not extinguish it. Instead, as courts generally do when
assessing claims for consequential damages from a breach of contract, the
court should ask if the damages this plaintiff suffered were foreseeable to the
Authority and purchaser at the time of sale. 206
Where the plaintiff resided in the neighborhood at the time the Authority
made the sale and expected a property value increase from the renovation of
a neighboring house, any such consequential damages were foreseeable to the
buyer. That foreseeability suggests that these plaintiffs were the kind of third
parties the government sought to benefit by entering the contract. 207 In fact,

203. See supra Section II.B.
204. Perkins, supra note 190 (“[E]veryone who’s working on a property and remains in
communication with the Land Bank receives [an extension] . . . .”).
205. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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they are likely the exact sort of plaintiffs the government intended to benefit:
long-time residents who have stayed in the city despite vacancies and blight
in their neighborhood. 208
Consequential damages may not be foreseeable when the plaintiff is engaged in speculation, though. A speculator might, for example, purchase
properties in a neighborhood where the Authority has previously sold a number of homes because they take the sales as a signal that property values will
go up. They may then hope to sell or rent the properties at a large profit once
the neighboring homes are occupied as the Authority buyers promised. 209 If,
however, the speculator was expecting a kind of return that was not foreseeable to the Authority buyer when they entered the contract, the equitable case
for allowing the speculator to enforce the contract is weaker. Perhaps the speculator purchased properties with plans to sell to a commercial developer or to
develop the properties themselves. 210 The original purchaser of the land bank
property may have foreseen when they purchased that the neighboring residential properties would expect modest increases in value but may not have
been able to foresee that a speculator would expect profits at a commercial
scale based on their promise to renovate. Justice may not demand a remedy
for that speculator who effectively gambled on the purchaser fulfilling their
promise. The foreseeability analysis called for in this Note can help distinguish
between these two sorts of putative third-party beneficiaries. 211
CONCLUSION
When citizens are promised benefits by a party contracting with the government and left empty-handed when those benefits are not delivered, justice

208. See Trickey, supra note 182 (“[W]e still have time to save the large stretches of this
city that are still filled with residents who want to stay in their homes.” (quoting Mayor Mike
Duggan)).
209. That is not to say that no plaintiff who bought a house next to an Authority purchase
after the Authority already made the sale would have third-party beneficiary standing. As with
third-party beneficiary claims where homeowners new to a neighborhood rely on Homeowners
Association contracts that predate their arrival to preserve the value of their homes going forward, a resident new to a neighborhood could rely on the buyer’s promise to renovate the house
even though it predates their arrival in the neighborhood. See, e.g., Scarpitti v. Weborg, 609 A.2d
147 (Pa. 1992).
210. As one of many possible examples, a recent development in Islandview, a neighborhood east of downtown Detroit, illustrates the need for foreseeability analysis in deciding if a
developer could enforce a Land Bank Authority contract as a third-party beneficiary. A developer
is investing $2.46 million into a building in the neighborhood to convert it into townhouses, with
rents starting around $1,300 per month. John Carlisle, Detroit Neighborhood Group Sees Gentrification as the Enemy, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (May 24, 2020, 9:24 AM), https://www.freep.com/
in-depth/news/columnists/john-carlisle/2020/05/24/detroit-neighborhood-gentrification-protest-carlisle/4954702002 [perma.cc/4GTE-XSKV]. It would be inequitable to allow that developer to seek lost profits from rents far higher than the neighborhood norm if another Islandview
resident who purchased a home from the Land Bank failed to complete their Land Bank renovations on time, making it harder for the developer to find renters.
211. See supra Section II.C.
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demands a remedy. An equitable approach to the third-party beneficiary doctrine can provide one. Empty and broken promises harm citizens. They allow
governments to extract goodwill or ease political pressure only to underdeliver down the line, thereby undermining trust in government. And they give
a windfall to private parties contracting with the government. The costs of
broken promises are clear in Detroit 212: “Everybody knew you couldn’t get to
51 percent.” 213 Yet this was the major jobs promise extracted from the contractors hired to build the Little Caesars Arena; 51 percent of the construction
jobs would go to bona fide Detroiters. In exchange, the developers received
more than $300 million of taxpayer money. 214
An equitable approach to third-party beneficiary doctrine can make clear
to governments and their contracting partners that when they say they are
contracting to benefit a group of citizens, they should mean it. And it empowers citizens to make them mean it.

212. See, e.g., Louis Aguilar, Detroit’s Decade of Growth Has Been Separate and Unequal, New
Study Finds, BRIDGE MICH. (May 16, 2021), https://www.bridgemi.com/urban-affairs/detroits-decade-growth-has-been-separate-and-unequal-new-study-finds [perma.cc/XKW3-MF8Z] (“[P]olicies [have] focused too much on giving tax breaks for downtown projects and new housing
where rent is too expensive for most residents [while] neighborhoods and longtime Detroiters
grappled with mass tax foreclosures, prohibitive lending practices and inadequate public
transit.”).
213. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
214. Max Bultman & Cody Stavenhagen, Detainments at Little Caesars Arena Add to Venue’s
Complicated Symbolism, ATHLETIC (June 10, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1860439/2020/06/10/
detainments-at-little-caesars-arena-add-to-venues-complicated-symbolism [perma.cc/65B2FU6N].

